Communications in Humanities Research
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Communications in Humanities Research
Vol. 6, 14 September 2023
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The Possibility of Artificial Qualia
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Abstract
The discussions about qualia are mind-body problems. If artificial intelligence provides a functionally identical body, will it possess the same conscious experience? The possibility of artificial qualia, which is on the cutting edge of the development of artificial intelligence, will be the main topic of this essay. This paper argues the presupposition of the possibility of artificial qualia is the possibility of strong AI. Searl was the first person to question the possibility of strong AI by formulating the Chinese Room Argument. This paper introduces common objections from artificial intelligence practitioners and the development of modern AI, proving the invalid of the objection and claiming the possibility of strong AI. Next, this paper follows David Chalmers’ argument about the principle of organizational invariance and reconstructs Chalmers’ two Reductio ad Absurdum arguments to rebut objections. By formulating fading qualia argument and dancing qualia argument, the absent qualia argument and the inverted qualia argument are proved wrong. The principle can support the possibility of artificial qualia.
Keywords
qualia, strong AI, the principle of organizational invariance
References
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Data Availability
The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study will be available from the authors upon reasonable request.
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- Volume Title
- Proceedings of the International Conference on Social Psychology and Humanity Studies
- ISBN (Print)
- 978-1-83558-005-9
- ISBN (Online)
- 978-1-83558-006-6
- Published Date
- 14 September 2023
- Series
- Communications in Humanities Research
- ISSN (Print)
- 2753-7064
- ISSN (Online)
- 2753-7072
- DOI
- 10.54254/2753-7064/6/20230083
- Copyright
- 14 September 2023
- Open Access
- This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited