Communications in Humanities Research
- The Open Access Proceedings Series for Conferences
Vol. 7, 31 October 2023
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German philosopher Kant, in his moral philosophy, made a clear distinction between categorical imperative and hypothetical imperative. Under his three propositions of morality, Kant argued that only actions motivated by maxims (or moral principles) rather than any other emotional feelings could produce moral worth. Since then, the criticism from Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and a series of reconciling propositions from other later scholars such as Paten, Henson towards such Kantian dichotomy have never ended. This sets the main focus of my article.The article is divided into three parts: the first part expounds the content and ethical basis of Kantian philosophy by explaining the epistemological gap between noumenon and phenomenon. The second part focuses on four different reconciling propositions proposed by Paton, Henson, Herman, and Allison as well as their shared issue: they all try to revise the conclusion within Kantian philosophy in a theory of motivation outside the Kantian philosophy. By tracing back to the three propositions and the relationship between autonomy and heteronomy, the last part offers the article’s own argument: though Kant denies emotion as a motivation to produce moral worth, he does not exclude it from the inevitable concomitant from phenomena.
moral philosophy, duty, kantianism, moral value
1. Michael Stocker, (1976) “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories”, Journal of Philosophy, (73).
2. Bernards Williams, (1973)“Morality and the Emotions”, in Problems of the Self, Cambridge University Press.
3. Philippa Foot, (2002) Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Oxford University Press.
4. H.J. Paton, (1974) The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, London: Hutchinson University Library.
5. Richard G. (1979) Henson, What Kant Might Have Said: Moral Worth and the Overdetermination of Dutiful Action, The Philosophical Review.
6. Herman, (1933) Barbara: The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
7. Henry E. Allison, (2011)Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, Oxford University Press.
8. Gongrui. (2018) On the Conciliatory propositions of Kant’s first proposition of duty [J]. Morality and Civilization, (03):64-71.
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